Part-time Assistant ProfessorTeaching StreamUniversity of TorontoDepartment of Philosophy
email: mpscarf1@gmail.com
(if you're looking for the TikTok teen, you have the wrong Scarfone) 

Teaching

Courses


2023-24
PHL 275 Introduction to Ethics (Fall '23)PHL 407 Seminar in Ethics - Ethical Mooreanism (Fall '23)
PHL 275 Introduction to Ethics (Winter '24)PHL 341 Freedom, Responsibility, and Human Action (Winter '24)PHL 376 Topics in Moral Philosophy - Ethics of Relationships (Winter '24)

Research

Papers

Evolutionary Debunking and the Folk/Theoretical Distinction, Philosophia (2024) 

Abstract: In metaethics, evolutionary debunking arguments combine empirical and epistemological premises to purportedly show that our moral judgments are unjustified. One objection to these arguments has been to distinguish between those judgments that evolutionary influence might undermine versus those that it does not. This response is powerful but not well understood. In this paper I flesh out the response by drawing upon a familiar distinction in the natural sciences, where it is common to distinguish folk judgments from theoretical judgments. I argue that this in turn illuminates the proper scope of the evolutionary debunking argument, but not in an obvious way: it is a very specific type of undermining argument that targets those theories where theoretical judgments are inferred merely from folk judgments. One upshot of this conclusion is that it reveals a verboten methodology in metaethics. The evolutionary debunking argument is therefore much less powerful than its proponents have supposed, but it nevertheless rules out what is perhaps a common way of attempting to justify moral judgments.

Using and Abusing Moorean Arguments, Journal of the American Philosophical Association (2022) 

Abstract: Metaethical Mooreanism is the view that without being able to explain how we know certain moral claims we can nevertheless be sure that we do know them. In this paper I focus on the Moorean argument against moral error theory. I conclude that it fails. To show this failure, I first distinguish Moorean claims from Moorean arguments, and then so-called presumptive support from dialogical support. With these distinctions in place, I argue that the key Moorean claim requires dialogical support in order to be used within the Moorean argument against moral error theory, but metaethical Mooreans have only provided presumptive support for the Moorean claim. Not only is this presumptive support inadequate for fending off the moral error theory, it is doubtful that Mooreans can actually provide dialogical support for the key Moorean claim. 

Incoherent Abortion Exceptions, Journal of Social Philosophy (2020) 

Abstract: There has recently been an expansion of anti-abortion measures in the United States. Within these various measures there is a divide over certain exceptions: some States permit abortion for pregnancies caused by rape while other States do not. This paper explores the underlying moral justification for such exceptions. I argue that within the dominant moral framework for reproductive ethics these exceptions are incoherent by their own lights. But this is not a defense of an exceptionless anti-abortion position. Rather, because the typical way of making such exceptions is incoherent, this shows why the anti-abortion movement is dangerous: as these incoherencies are acknowledged, this may lead to ever stricter measures being put in place. I end by suggesting that those who are sympathetic to these exceptions should find it easier to move to a pro-choice position rather than to a more extreme, exceptionless one.

Public Philosophy

"If you're pro-life, you might already be pro-choice", The Conversation (September 2020)

"Why driving an electric vehicle might not be morally praiseworthy", The Conversation (August 2021)

Talking about moral praise and electric cars on The Mike Farwell Show 570 AM Kitchener (August 2021)

Still talking about moral praise and electric cars on Moment of Truth 106.5 FM Toronto (September 2021)

Under Review


[a paper on moral intuitionism]
[a paper on unity in moral judgment]
[a coauthored paper on moral self-deception]